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NOTES AND COMMENT
Adverse possession and easements! estoppel: foundations and
projections: open and notorious, necessity of.
In the case of Broadway- Wisconsin Inv. Co. v. Sentinel Company
an important point of property law 'was settled. The point at issue
was whether the defendant had acquired title by adverse possession
to the premises in controversy occupied for more than thirty years by
the footings and overhanging cornices and moldings of its building.
The piers of the defendant's building at one corner rested upon and
projected into the property acquired by the plaintiff to the extent of
more than three feet. The tops of these piers were about three feet
below the surface of the soil and were not visible on ordinary exami-
nation of the surface. The evidence disclosed that the nature of their
projection into the adjoining property was visible at the time the
building was erected because of the extent of the opening, but there
was no evidence that their presence was observable after the original
construction. The premises onto which these subsurface projections
extended were occupied in part by a large downtown building. At
the point of encroachment the surface of the ground was vacant,
although nothing indicated any adverse possession below the surface
of the ground.
As for the overhanging projections, there was an ornamental terra
cota cornice extending thirteen inches over the property line at a
point approximately twenty feet from the top of the building near
the eighth story, and a six-inch projection extending about three feet
from the corner of the building, at the third floor level, over the pro-
perty line and onto plaintiff's close.
The findings of the case on this phase were similar to those in the
Ogden v. Straus Building Corporation case 2 which had previously
arisen in the same county-Milwaukee. Similarly the decision of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in that case was held to rule in the present
on the question of the nature of the possession required to give a good
right against the owner thereof. The court in the instant case disposed
of the contentions set out above as follows:
It is contended here that the court erred in holding that the defendant had
not acquired by adverse possession and estoppel the right to maintain its en-
croaching footings and its cornices and moldings. The trial court was clearly
right in holding as it did, for the reason that such possession as the defendant
had of the plaintiff's premises was neither open nor notorious. [Citing Ogden v.
Straus Bwilding Corporation, supra, and Illinois Steel Co. v. Tamnis.]
1212 N.W. 646 (Wis.), decided March 8, 1927.
1 187 Wis. 232, 2o2 N.W. 34.
'154 Wis. 340, 141 N.W. ioli.
NOTES AND COMMENT
An owner of land is not required, in order to prevent a trespasser from ac-
quiring title thereto, to explore beneath the surface or to ascertain at his peril
whether or not an encroachment eighty or ioo feet above the surface does or
does not overhang his property. There may be cases, of course, as eaves of
buildings and the like, where possession is open and notorious and the rule applies,
but cases of that kind have no application to the facts here.
A point at issue was whether sections 330.02, 330.o8, and 33o.o9 of
the Wisconsin Statutes state the maximum exclusive limits of posses-
sion to give title by adverse holding. They state nothing with refer-
ence to openness and notoriety of the adverse possession. Herein the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the old rule that the possession must be
open and notorious to be adverse, and decided that the evidence pre-
sented did not fulfill the requisites of good adverse possession.
The briefs of the parties and those in the Ogden case, supra, cover
the Wisconsin cases on the points at issue and. collateral questions.
They set forth cases illustrating the facts necessary to show good ad-
verse possession of similar structures, and cases where the facts have
been held to be insufficient. H. W. I.
Constitutional Law: Invalidity of Negro Suffrage Restriction in
Primary Elections.-Another effort of one of our sister states of the
south to curb the influence of the negro has been thwarted by the
Supreme Court of United States.
Texas, in 1923, passed a statute by the words of which "in no event
shall a negro be eligible to participate in a Democratic party primary
election held in the state of Texas," etc. In the instant case Nixon v.
Herndon,: the defendants were members of an election board, and the
plaintiff was a negro, otherwise a qualified voter, who was denied the
right to vote at the Democratic party primary election in 1924. The
defendants' refusal was on the strength of the statute above quoted.
Plaintiff contested the* constitutionality of the statute as a direct in-
fringement of his rights under the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments.
The court gave no extended opinion in sustaining plaintiff's contention;
rather, it declared in unequivocal terms that "it seems hard to imagine
a more direct and obvious infringement of the fourteenth amendment"
as it was a direct discrimination against the negro by denying him the
equal protection of the law. Satisfied that the fourteenth amendment
standing alone was sufficient to declare the statute unconstitutional,
the contention that the fifteenth amendment was violated was not con-
sidered.
The result reached is one which may well be indorsed by one desirous
of a just interpretation of our constitution and its amendments. The
case, however, brings to mind the question: Upon what theory did the
legislature of the state of Texas hope that the enactment would be up-
held? The statute, as may be noted, was not couched in such a manner
as to effect an illegal discrimination without such discrimination being
evident on its face.2 Again it could hardly have been anticipated that
147 Sup. Court Rep. Advance sheet, Mar. 15, 1927, page 446.
2For contrast, see 189 U.S. 475.
